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Background Paper
THE IMPORTANCE OF CODEX TO THE WORLD FOOD TRADE

Although the Codex Alimentarius Commission has functioned as part of the United Nations’ Food and Agriculture Organization since 1962, its activities have been of little more than occasional interest to the international food trade until recent years. However, with the advent of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the establishment of the North American Free Trade Agreement and other regional trading blocs, the deliberations of Codex have become significantly more important to the international trade interests of governments.

Increased interest in the elaboration of Codex standards, guidelines, and recommendations may be attributed to increased international awareness of two very practical functions of the Commission and its numerous committees. First, developing countries lacking both the expertise and financial resources to fully develop food regulatory structures adequate for the protection of public health and the free flow of goods within their own borders have become aware that the guidance and information needed to fill in these regulatory gaps is often made available in the Codex activities and deliberations of delegates from more industrialized nations. Second, both producer and consumer groups have become aware of the role that Codex has been given in the WTO Agreements as the means by which disputes over trade in food products may be resolved.

Increased awareness of the practical functions of Codex activities in shaping national legislation and establishing international trade standards has strengthened Codex’s role as the focal point of efforts to achieve internationally harmonized food standards. However, as the Commission’s work has continued in recent years, many international regulatory gaps show signs of being filled by legislation that imposes burdens on industry without demonstrable benefits to public welfare. In their most troublesome manifestations, some of these measures, especially recent regulations concerning biotech food labeling, could be viewed as technical barriers to trade.

Such an outcome would cause severe trade dislocation, even if effected on a piecemeal basis. The creation of a maze of conflicting and confusing regulatory certification documents and labeling requirements in the more than 150 jurisdictions around the globe that serve to do little more for food safety than provide at great cost, time and expense that which the world’s food manufacturers already do on their own initiative: test and self-certify the safety of their products. They are bound by an enforcement mechanism far more effective than the disapproval of one regulatory agency or another: strict liability in tort for harm resulting from misbranded, mislabeled or unsafe food products. Rather than add additional layers of regulation, consumers, producers and regulators would be better served by the development of reliable and seamless self-certification or third-party certification mechanisms designed to provide real, tangible evidence of proper production and handling of food to consumers.

In such a context, the economic and trade implications of the adoption of a Codex guideline or recommendation on biotech food labeling are numerous, given the questions of scope, application, traceability, and documentation that are to be addressed by the drafting group. However, the controversy surrounding many of these issues and the corresponding likelihood of trade disputes arising based on labeling concerns is not limited to the possible creation of non-tariff barriers to trade. The elaboration of new Codex guidelines and recommendations may also impact the application of international food safety agreements, such as the WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Measures.

For example, by accepting the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO Agreement), WTO member governments agree to be bound by the rules in all of the multilateral trade agreements attached to it, including the SPS Agreement and the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT). Codex texts are particularly relevant to the application of the SPS and TBT agreements because the agreements specifically direct member governments to utilize texts in taking decisions under the agreements.

Should disputes arise between member governments regarding the application of agreements such as the SPS or TBT, parties have recourse to the procedures for dispute settlement under the 1994 Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) (Annex 2 to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994). Article 3 of the DSU outlines the function of the dispute settlement system, which is to preserve the rights and obligations of Members under the covered agreements and to clarify the existing provisions of those agreements in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public international law. Thus, the source of law under consideration in dispute settlement is the texts of the agreements themselves, including any explicit references to Codex guidelines, standards, or recommendations.

While the WTO itself is not responsible for developing food safety standards, it does have the authority to place restrictions on the use of food safety measures as unjustified or disguised barriers to trade. The WTO accomplishes this task primarily through the SPS Agreement, although the TBT Agreement also addresses food quality requirements and other food safety issues not covered by the SPS Agreement. As noted earlier, the trade implications of the development of Codex guidelines or recommendations on biotech labeling depend in part on the referenced role of Codex guidelines in the relevant international food safety agreements.

The role of Codex standards, guidelines, and recommendations in the application of SPS measures is referred to several times throughout the Agreement. Perhaps most importantly, in Article 3, which addresses the harmonization of phytosanitary standards, the SPS reads as follows:

To harmonize sanitary and phytosanitary measures on as wide a basis as possible, Members shall base their sanitary or phytosanitary measures on international standards, guidelines, or recommendations where they exist, except as otherwise provided for in the Agreement, and in particular, paragraph 3.[1]

Sanitary or Phytosanitary measure which conform to international standards, guidelines, or recommendations shall be deemed necessary to protect human, animal, or plant life or health, and presumes to be consistent with the relevant provisions of this Agreement and of GATT 1994.

International standards, guidelines, and recommendations for food safety are further defined in Annex A to the SPS Agreement as “the standards, guidelines, and recommendations established by the Codex Alimentarius Commission relating to food additives, veterinary drugs and pesticide residues, contaminants, methods of analysis and sampling, and codes and guidelines of hygienic practice.”

Thus, if Codex were to adopt undefined and inconsistent standards or guidelines, all Member nations would be given license to adopt the same or similar standards as national law and implement those standards, without risk of violating either the SPS or TBT Agreements. The WTO will almost certainly rule in accordance with Codex standards in any potential dispute settlement proceeding, regardless of the validity or the value of the standard; whether its motive is scientific or political, or whether or not the burdens on consumers, producers and regulators are onerous or not.

These factors are vital in our collective consideration, as we approach the next round of Codex discussions regarding Food Labeling, where the shape of future standards in a number of critical areas may well be decided, for better or for worse. Those who are entrusted with the making of such decisions must be mindful of the fact that the recent outbreaks of BSE and foot-and-mouth disease, as well as other food safety crises of recent years, are ample evidence that there are real threats which warrant the time and energy of regulators and activists. These should be the focal point of Codex’s activity in the future, and in doing so, Codex would nobly fulfill its mission to ensure the safety of the global food supply, an open trading system.


[1] Article 3.3. permits Members the opportunity to introduce measures that result in a higher level of SPS protection than would otherwise be achieved by measures based on the relevant standards, guidelines, or recommendations if there is a scientific justification or if the member finds the level of protection appropriate in accordance with (1) and (2) above. Codex standards and guidelines come into play again under the definition of “scientific justification,” which requires that a member determined, based on an examination and evaluation of available scientific information, that the relevant international standard, guideline, or recommendation does not provide sufficient SPS protection.